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SUMMARY 
Business subsidies in Canada: the “winner” is Alberta; the loser is the taxpayer
The federal government and the four largest provinces in Canada spend about 
$29 billion a year on business subsidies, delivered through program spending, 
the tax system, government business enterprises and direct investments by 
government. These subsidies represent almost half of the corporate income tax 
revenue collected by the five jurisdictions.
Surprisingly, given its reputation as a bastion of free enterprise, Alberta is the 
most prolific subsidizer. In the 2014-15 fiscal year, per person subsidies were 
$640 in Alberta, about $100 ahead of the next most generous jurisdiction, 
Québec. Alberta has probably added to its “lead” through measures introduced 
in the October 2015 Fiscal Update and the 2016 budget. Alberta also stands out 
by having the least transparent public reporting of business subsidies. 
What motivates governments to subsidize business? Abstracting from cynical 
efforts to win votes, business subsidies have two broad objectives: to improve 
economic performance and to achieve a social objective by supporting specific 
firms, industries or regions. On average in the five jurisdictions, the split between 
the two categories is about 70-30 in favour of economic development measures. 
Assessing value for money from programs with a social objective is subjective, 
but measures intended to improve economic performance should be assessed 
on their ability to raise real income. Business subsidies can only raise real income 
if markets fail to allocate labour and capital to their best uses. The classic case 
is R&D. When a firm undertakes R&D, some of the knowledge created inevitably 
spills over to the benefit other firms. Firms are focused on their own benefits 
and costs when deciding how much to spend on R&D, not the benefits received 
by other firms, so society has an interest in encouraging additional R&D. While markets 
generally do a good job allocating capital to its most productive uses, governments 
express concern about the ability of small firms to access external financing. Just over 
half of business subsidies are intended to address these two issues. 
Governments also provide subsidies in order to create what are often described as 
“good jobs,” meaning employment in high-wage, high-productivity industries. There is 
ample evidence that wages differ by sector even after differences in worker skills and 
working conditions are taken into account. That opens up the possibility that subsidizing 
high-wage jobs will make us better off. Almost 10 per cent of government subsidies are 
pursuing “industrial policy” objectives.
But real income won't necessarily go up, even in these circumstances. Benefit-cost 
analyses of key programs suggest that, at best, only a third of subsidies intended to raise 
real income achieve their objective. The main reason these subsidies are unsuccessful is 
that they have to be funded, either by raising taxes or cutting program spending, both of 
which harm economic performance. And avoiding the pitfall of excessive subsidization 
can be challenging. For example, small firms performing R&D get about 43% of their 
funding from governments, which is substantially beyond an effective level. Industrial 
policy measures are particularly tricky to get right. Governments have to identify sectors 
and firms that pay a premium for a given set of skills and working conditions, determine 
the subsidy that generates a social benefit net of the costs of providing assistance and 
avoid transferring income from low to high-wage taxpayers.
With so much money at play, business subsidies should be reported more transparently 
and managed more effectively. For greater transparency, governments should prepare 
a comprehensive annual report on business subsidies delivered through program 
spending, the tax system and through the activities of government business enterprises. 
The report would describe the programs, state their objectives and report funding levels. 
When discussing program objectives, the report should set out in general terms the 
expected benefits and costs of government intervention and discuss who benefits from 
the measure and who is expected to pay for it. Making a commitment to set out the 
expected benefits and costs of all new business subsidies as they are introduced might 
prevent the worst offenders from being implemented in the first place.
1SUMMARY
Governments provide support to business through a number of channels, including spending 
programs, the tax system, direct investment and the activities of government business enterprises. 
This paper presents the first comprehensive estimates of such assistance, or “business subsidies,” 
for the federal government and the four largest provinces: British Columbia (B.C.), Alberta, Ontario 
and Quebec. The paper provides a snapshot of overall business subsidies in 2014–15, the latest year 
for which data are available for all five jurisdictions. A 10-year perspective is also provided for all 
jurisdictions except Alberta, which began publishing tax expenditure estimates in 2013. The paper 
provides assessments of some key programs and makes recommendations for improving the way 
business subsidies are reported by governments. 
Federal government business subsidies amounted to $14 billion in 2014–15. Business subsidies 
amounted to $14.6 billion in the four provinces. Per capita subsidies were largest in Alberta at 
$640 and lowest in B.C. and the federal government, with both at $390. The tax system is by 
far the preferred delivery vehicle in all jurisdictions except Quebec, accounting for almost half 
to two-thirds of overall subsidies. Subsidies are highly concentrated in all jurisdictions except 
Quebec. For example, small business accounts for about 40 to 60 per cent of business subsidies in 
all jurisdictions except Quebec, where the small-business share is just under 20 per cent. Budgets 
tabled since 2014–15 suggest that the level of business subsidies will remain relatively stable in the 
near term in B.C. and Quebec. Increases are likely in Ontario and at the federal level. Announced 
increases in Alberta are more substantial, particularly when measured on an accrual basis. 
Over the 10-year period ending in 2014–15, federal real per capita subsidies rose substantially 
during the economic downturn but were trimmed sharply thereafter. The net change over the 
period was a decline of nine per cent. Subsidies in Quebec had a similar profile, but the increase 
was more substantial and the reduction more subdued. The net increase over the period was 25 per 
cent. Real per capita subsidies in Ontario were on an upward trend until 2012–13; small reductions 
in the following two years resulted in a net increase of 43 per cent over the 10-year period. In B.C., 
there was a sharp downward correction to business subsidies in 2006–07, but this was almost 
completely offset by increases over the three years ending in 2014–15. 
Governments provide business subsidies for a number of reasons, including to address market 
failures, to promote high-wage, high-productivity industries and to transfer income. Measures in 
the first category clearly have the potential to improve economic performance, with the impact 
depending on the size of the benefits relative to the costs of providing assistance. There is much 
less of a consensus on the ability of measures in the second category, which are often labelled 
“industrial policies,” to improve economic performance, primarily because governments have to 
choose which industries and firms to support. About 70 per cent of business subsidies fall into the 
first two categories. Benefit-cost analyses of key programs suggest that, at best, only a third of 
spending in these categories, or about a fifth of overall subsidies, succeeds in raising real income. 
Governments should be more transparent in reporting business subsidies. Quebec and the federal 
government provide the most useful information on subsidies. Both of these governments classify 
program-spending subsidies by recipient class: businesses, individuals, non-profits and other levels 
of government. Quebec takes the additional step of identifying subsidies received by business 
both directly and indirectly through other levels of government and non-profit organizations. 
This approach should be adopted by other jurisdictions. On the other hand, Quebec undertakes a 
substantial fraction of its spending on subsidies through special funds, most of which provide only 
minimal detail on revenues and expenditures. It is therefore difficult to identify the beneficiaries of 
their spending. The federal government and Quebec both publish comprehensive documentation 
of tax expenditures. Quebec presents estimates for all tax bases while the federal estimates do not 
include excise taxes, a deficiency that should be remedied. The federal estimates are available in 
digital format for an extended historical period, which is an example for other jurisdictions to follow. 
2Subsidies delivered through spending programs are reasonably well documented in B.C. and 
Ontario, but the amount received by business, either directly or indirectly, is not identified. Alberta 
reports subsidies by ministry, but the data are not presented by program, which is a serious lack of 
transparency. As a result, the only way to determine business subsidies delivered through program 
spending in Alberta is to file access to information requests. Ontario, Alberta and B.C. provide 
comprehensive estimates of tax expenditures. However, documentation is less detailed in the 
Ontario accounts than for Quebec or the federal government and is sparse for Alberta and B.C. All 
three jurisdictions present estimates for a single year in their annual publications. These provinces 
should adopt the reporting standards of the federal government and Quebec.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I present estimates of assistance, or subsidies, provided to private businesses by the 
government of Canada and the four largest provinces: British Columbia (B.C.), Alberta, Ontario 
and Quebec. These four provinces account for about 85 per cent of Canada’s GDP and population. 
The estimates in this paper are comprehensive in the sense that they include measures delivered 
through direct spending programs, through the tax system, through direct investments in firms, 
through loan-guarantee programs and through the activities of government business enterprises 
(GBEs). The assistance, or burden, of regulatory initiatives is not included. In order to develop the 
estimates, I supplemented publicly available information on business subsidies with data obtained 
from access-to-information requests. In addition, I examined the annual reports and financial 
statements of GBEs to determine the extent that their activities effectively subsidize business and 
quantified the amount of the subsidy. 
The next section of the paper reviews the rationales for government intervention. A discussion of 
the data sources and methodology used in the study is presented in Section 3, which also includes 
recommendations for improving how governments report business subsidies. Section 4 provides a 
snapshot of overall business subsidies in 2014–15. Subsidies are classified by delivery instrument, 
sector, activity and rationale. Section 5 summarizes developments in business subsidies since 2014–
15. A 10-year perspective is provided in Section 6 for all jurisdictions except Alberta, which began 
publishing tax expenditure estimates in 2013. An assessment of some key programs is presented in 
Section 7. The last section contains concluding remarks. 
2. RATIONALES FOR SUBSIDIZING BUSINESS
Governments provide subsidies, or more generally, intervene in markets for a number of reasons. 
One rationale is to correct market failures, which could arise from externalities, asymmetric 
information or other market imperfections. Externalities arise when prices do not capture all the 
costs and benefits of economic activity. The classic positive externality is investment in R&D, 
which occurs because R&D performed by one firm inevitably leaks out and provides (unpaid) 
benefits to other firms. Since firms cannot capture all of the benefits from the R&D they perform, 
the amount undertaken will be too low from society’s perspective, so a subsidy may be justified. 
Governments may also see positive externalities in promoting national culture or national self-
sufficiency in certain products. The classic negative externality is pollution, which is addressed 
with both tax measures and subsidies.
Asymmetric information problems arise in two circumstances. The problem of hidden information 
occurs when the two sides of a transaction have different information about a product’s quality or 
the riskiness of an investment; this is known as an adverse-selection problem. The second type of 
asymmetric information problem arises from hidden actions: one of the parties to a transaction 
can take actions that are not observable by the other party and which can affect product quality or 
the riskiness of an investment. This is known as moral hazard or as a principal-agent problem. The 
3impact of asymmetric information is particularly severe for innovative firms due to the complexity 
of their activities. Further, the impact of asymmetric information varies across capital markets, 
likely causing underinvestment by startup entrepreneurs and overinvestment in the venture capital 
segment of risk capital.1 Subsidizing access to capital by startup entrepreneurs is therefore more 
likely to improve economic performance than is subsidizing venture capital.
Governments also provide subsidies in order to create what are often described as “good jobs,” 
meaning employment in high-wage, high-productivity industries, which could be established or 
nascent. Such policies could only be successful in the presence of imperfectly competitive, or 
at least incomplete, markets, which would allow a subsidy-induced reallocation of labour and 
capital to improve economic outcomes. There is a substantial body of evidence documenting large 
and persistent inter-industry wage differentials that do not appear to be caused by differences in 
labour quality (Lester, Forthcoming), which suggests that the minimum condition for a successful 
intervention is met. Nevertheless, the majority view in the economics profession is that “industrial 
policies” harm rather than help economic performance,2 reflecting doubts on the ability of 
governments to choose appropriate targets and the fact that there are substantial costs associated 
with providing assistance. 
Another rationale for targeted intervention by government is to improve the trade-off between 
efficiency and protecting the tax base that often occurs when designing the tax system. Some 
otherwise sound policies cause unintended revenue losses and recovering the lost revenue results 
in a net loss in efficiency. One example is the treatment of profit and losses: profits are taxed as 
earned, while there are limitations on the deductibility of losses. This asymmetric treatment raises 
the effective tax rate on startups and other unprofitable firms. In principle, efficiency would be 
enhanced by ensuring that business losses affect net income as they are incurred, up to the point 
of refunding losses to non-taxable firms. In practice, however, such a policy would encourage 
multinational firms to book more losses in a country providing refundability, which would reduce 
revenue without any improvement in efficiency.3 Policies such as flow-through-share deductions are 
intended to improve tax efficiency by treating profits and losses more symmetrically, while limiting 
the scope for unintended revenue losses by restricting eligibility by firm size and sector. 
The taxation of capital gains also involves a compromise between efficiency and protecting the tax 
base. As discussed by Mintz and Richardson (1995) taxation of capital gains can give rise to double 
taxation. This occurs, for example, when an innovation raises the expected profitability of a firm, 
thereby increasing the value of its shares. If the shares are sold, the additional income generated by 
the innovation will be taxed twice: once as a capital gain and a second time when it is distributed as 
dividends. That is, taxing both the present value of the higher income stream and the stream itself 
results in double taxation. Exempting capital gains in these circumstances would improve efficiency. 
On the other hand, exempting capital gains makes it harder to protect the revenue base, even if the 
exemption is restricted to gains on business shares. For example, firms would have an incentive to 
use share buy-backs to substitute tax-free capital gains for dividends. Restricting the capital gains 
exemption to small firms reduces the importance of unintended revenue losses because the scope for 
international profit shifting is limited and because many small businesses are unprofitable.4
Governments also intervene to promote equity by redistributing income. For example, a number 
of programs provide subsidized agricultural income insurance, which effectively transfers income 
to farmers from other taxpayers while sustaining agricultural production. There is a similar 
outcome when governments use business subsidies to retain or attract economic activity in specific 
1 
See Lester (2017a)
2 
For a review of the theoretical underpinnings of and the empirical support for industrial policies see Pack and Saggi (2006)
3 
For a more detailed discussion see Mintz et al. (1997)
4 
In 2009, about two-thirds of firms eligible to claim the small business deduction did not do so because they did not have 
positive active business income. The source is unpublished data from Dachis and Lester (2015).
4regions. While there is an efficiency argument supporting regional development subsidies,5 altering 
the market-determined spatial distribution of economic activity will generally result in lower 
overall income along with an income transfer to residents in the subsidized region from other 
taxpayers. Another example is assistance paid to firms or individuals in order to help them adjust to 
structural changes, such as import competition or technological change. In each of these examples, 
the government is providing income support without expecting an improvement in economic 
performance. There is a deliberate policy choice in favour of equity over efficiency. 
3. DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY
Governments subsidize business through spending programs, through tax measures and by 
making what are typically described in the public accounts as “loans, investments and advances” 
to government-controlled entities and private sector firms. Most of these investments are made in 
government-controlled entities, and more specifically in government business enterprises (GBEs). 
These GBEs may subsidize business by providing goods or services without recovering the full 
cost of capital employed or by purchasing goods and services at preferential prices. As a result, 
the activities of GBEs are considered a distinct source of subsidies, separate from other loans, 
investments and advances, which are described as “direct investment.” In contrast to spending 
programs and tax measures, supplementary calculations are required to determine the subsidy 
arising from the activities of GBEs and direct investment in firms. 
Business subsidies in this study include all measures with an economic objective. Also included are 
agricultural insurance programs and regional development measures, both of which have economic 
objectives, but which also provide income support. Subsidies supporting Canadian culture are 
excluded since they are not expected to contribute to better economic performance. Subsidies 
promoting more efficient use of energy are also excluded on the grounds that their primary 
objective is to protect the environment.6 Finally, not all of the business subsidies provided by GBEs 
are included in this study. In particular, any subsidy arising from GBEs providing infrastructure 
services, such as port management, are excluded. Some measures that support activity of a specific 
sector without involving payments directly to firms are included in the estimates. For example, 
programs promoting tourism or providing funding for marketing activities in other sectors are 
included in business subsidies, providing that funding comes from general revenues rather than an 
industry levy. 
Following adoption of a Public Sector Accounting Board standard in 2012, refundable tax credits 
are classified as program spending by the federal government and all provinces. The extent to 
which refundable tax credits are integrated in the public accounts varies by jurisdiction. The 
treatment in the Ontario public accounts appears to be the most complete, with refundable tax 
credits appearing as program spending by the relevant department. In this study, refundable tax 
credits are included in subsidies delivered via program spending, while non-refundable credits are 
part of tax-based spending. 
The subsidy estimates in this paper should not, in principle, include delivery (administration) 
expenses. Fortunately, only subsidies delivered through direct spending programs in Quebec are 
gross of administration expenses.
5 
The efficiency argument for regional development programs is that depopulation will require public infrastructure (schools, 
hospitals, etc.) to be rebuilt elsewhere; to the extent that firms and households do not pay the full cost of building public 
infrastructure elsewhere, society bears some of the adjustment costs and some of these public funds could be allocated to 
sustaining regional activity.
6 This distinction glosses over the fact that in many cases protecting the environment also promotes economic development.
53.1. Program spending
All jurisdictions except Alberta publish information on subsidies by department and program 
in their public accounts, but only the federal government and Quebec present the data by major 
recipient — individuals, business, non-profit entities, and other levels of government.7 In addition, 
the federal public accounts present this information for agencies, such as the Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency, as well as for direct departmental activities. The federal government and 
Ontario recently began publishing subsidies by program and department in digital format.8 This 
information is available for the most recent five years for the federal government and for the two 
most recent years for Ontario.9
The federal public accounts include substantive program descriptions. Unfortunately, the 
subsidies data are presented by general recipient class at the department/agency level, not at the 
program level. Program-level data on subsidies by recipient class were obtained through access 
to information requests to all departments and agencies reporting subsidies to business. Program 
descriptions in the public accounts and additional information available in the Report on Plans 
and Priorities document published annually by each department were used to identify business 
subsidies and to estimate the proportion of payments to non-business entities that are ultimately 
received by business. 
For example, the federal public accounts report subsidies received directly by business amounting 
to $2.4 billion in the 2014–15 fiscal year, but about a third of that amount consisted of programs 
with a non-economic objective, such as aboriginal land-claims settlements, measures to protect 
the environment and support for cultural industries. On the other hand, payments received directly 
by business understate the amount of subsidies. In 2014–15, the federal government transferred 
about $600 million to provincial governments to fund cost-shared programs in agriculture, which 
was ultimately received by business.10 In addition, some of the transfers to non-profit entities were 
ultimately used to subsidize business. For example, Western Economic Diversification works with 
non-profit entities that deliver subsidies to business. After eliminating subsidies that did not have 
an economic objective and adding subsidies delivered by other levels of government and non-profit 
entities, federal business subsidies delivered via departmental program spending amounted to $2.9 
billion in 2014–15. Refundable tax credits, which are included in program spending, raised the total 
to $4.5 billion.
Federal business subsidies provided through departmental spending programs take two general 
forms: grants and contributions. Grants are unconditional subsidies; recipients are not required to 
report on the use of funds and are not audited. Contributions are subject to performance conditions 
and recipients must report on the use of funds; they are also subject to audit. Contributions may be 
non-repayable, or repayable with or without conditions. Non-repayable and conditionally repayable 
contributions are included in subsidies as they are made. Unconditionally repayable contributions 
are considered loans. Recoveries of conditionally repayable contributions are included in 
departmental revenues. In this study, these repayments are deducted from subsidies to avoid 
overstating subsidy payments; they represent a small share of total subsidies but are significant in 
several programs.
7 This information is presented by department in Volume 2 of the federal and Quebec public accounts.
8 
The federal and Ontario online databases can be accessed at http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ems-sgd/edb-bdd/index-eng.
html#start and https://www.ontario.ca/data/public-accounts-volume-1-data.
9 B.C., Alberta and the federal government publish data on transfers by individual recipient in digital format, but this 
information cannot easily be used to identify total subsidies received by business.
10 
This information is presented in Section 9, Volume 3 of the public accounts of Canada.
6The Quebec public accounts do not contain program descriptions. Brief descriptions appear in the 
Quebec Expenditure Budget,11 but these are not always sufficient to determine program objectives. 
Fortunately, the public accounts12 provide reasonably detailed data on subsidies by program and 
department. Further, these subsidies include payments received directly and indirectly by firms. 
As a result, business subsidies can be identified with a high degree of confidence. On the other 
hand, Quebec makes use of a substantial number of special funds13 to deliver spending programs. 
Only general information on the transactions made by these funds are included in the Quebec 
public accounts. Some funds, such as the Economic Development Fund, publish separate financial 
statements and details on spending are available in the annual report of the responsible department. 
In other cases, such as the Natural Resources Fund, the required information could only be 
obtained through access to information requests. Finally, in contrast to the other jurisdictions, the 
value of business subsidies delivered by departments includes administration costs.
The Quebec public accounts report business subsidies delivered through broadly defined spending 
programs amounting to $1.7 billion in fiscal 2014–15. However, less than half of this amount is 
included in subsidies as defined in this paper. For example, subsidies to commercial day-care 
centres and ambulance services amounted to about $900 million. A further $440 million was 
transferred to a GBE, La Financière agricole de Québec, so business subsidies delivered directly by 
departments amounted to $260 million in 2014–15. Subsidies delivered through special funds, such 
as the Economic Development Fund, are almost 70-per-cent larger than direct spending subsidies, 
bringing total subsidies delivered by departments to $700 million in 2014–15. Business subsidies 
delivered through refundable tax credits amounted to about $1.6 billion.
Ontario publishes a detailed breakdown of spending, including subsidies, by ministry and program 
in the public accounts. Ontario makes substantial use of special funds to deliver subsidies; these 
amounts are clearly identified in the public accounts. Information by broad category of recipient 
is not available. Ontario also includes the subsidy component of loans in program spending. That 
is, when loans are made on preferential terms, the value of the interest incentive is included as a 
subsidy in program spending. An example is $1.4 million in interest incentives provided through 
loans by the Strategic Jobs and Investment Fund. 
Descriptions of broad spending categories by ministry are included in the public accounts. These 
descriptions, along with the names of specific subsidy programs, can be used to identify subsidies 
to business. Such an approach is likely to overstate business subsidies because not all payments 
under these programs will be received by business. The subsidy estimates reported in this study for 
the period up to 2013–14 were obtained through an access to information request to the Ministry of 
Finance. There does not appear to be any attempt to eliminate subsidies received by non-business 
entities in compiling these estimates. Estimates of subsidies received by business in 2014–15 were 
developed by reviewing program descriptions in the public accounts, supplemented with estimates 
contained in a review of economic support programs in a 2015 report by Ontario’s auditor general.14 
Business subsidies delivered directly by departments amounted to $975 million in 2014–15, while 
subsidies delivered through refundable tax credits amounted to $800 million. 
B.C. presents subsidies by program and department in the public accounts, but information by 
broad category of recipient is not available. Although program descriptions are not available in 
the public accounts, they are provided in the expenditure budget (the “Estimates”).15 The public 
accounts also provide the aggregate value of subsidies related to natural resources and economic 
11 
Available at: http://www.tresor.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/PDF/budget_depenses/14–15/
AnnualExpenditureManagementPlansDepartmentsBodies.pdf.
12 
Volume 2, Section 3.
13 
Some of these funds have similar characteristics to federal agencies, such as the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency.
14 
Office of the Auditor General of Ontario (2015).
15 
http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2014/estimates/2014_Estimates.pdf.
7development. The Office of the Comptroller General of B.C. kindly supplied the program name 
and the value of subsidies included in this aggregate amount. The information supplied likely 
overstates business subsidies because some payments in this category will be received and spent 
by non-business entities. The value of business subsidies delivered directly by departments is very 
small, about $50 million in 2014–15. In contrast, subsidies delivered through refundable tax credits 
amounted to $510 million. 
Alberta stands out as being the least transparent on business subsidies delivered through spending 
programs. Alberta’s public accounts report only the aggregate value of subsidies by ministry. 
Programs are not systematically described in the public accounts and detailed information is 
difficult to obtain from other sources. Business subsidy programs were identified through access 
to information requests submitted to all ministries with business-related responsibilities. Given 
the limited documentation, it was not always possible to determine if a program constitutes a 
business subsidy or if some of the payments were received and spent by non-business entities. 
Subject to these limitations, I estimate that Alberta government departments delivered $585 million 
in business subsidies in 2014–15. Subsidies delivered through refundable tax credits were much 
smaller at $82 million. 
The federal estimates of business subsidies include payments made under federal-provincial 
shared-cost programs, which are concentrated in the agricultural sector. The federal share is 
excluded from published estimates of subsidies in all provinces except B.C. The gross payments 
under the shared-cost programs recorded in the B.C. public accounts were reduced by the 
percentage funded by the federal government, generally 60 per cent. 
3.2. Tax-based spending
A tax expenditure is typically defined as a measure that deviates from a benchmark tax system in 
order to achieve an economic or social objective. Depending on how the benchmark is specified, 
tax expenditures may include measures that fulfill the same function as program spending as well 
as measures that are implemented to address issues of the efficiency, fairness and simplicity of the 
tax system. In order to distinguish between the two categories, I proposed (Lester 2012b) using 
the term “tax-based spending programs” for the first category and structural tax measures for the 
second.16 The structural category includes measures implemented to promote horizontal equity, 
to recognize costs of earning income, to avoid double taxation and to keep administration and 
compliance costs at reasonable levels. 
Identifying business subsidies is more clear-cut for measures delivered through the tax system than 
for direct spending measures. All jurisdictions publish estimates of tax expenditures, and while the 
extent of documentation varies considerably (Table 1), it is not difficult to determine the objective 
of tax measures. A number of personal income tax measures promote economic development by 
reducing the tax burden on business-related income. Notable examples are the lifetime capital gains 
exemptions for small-business shares and farming and fishing property as well as flow-through-
share deductions. 
Estimates of the tax revenue forgone are not provided for all measures included in the tax 
expenditure reports. In most cases, the amount involved is likely to be small. Two exceptions 
are accelerated capital cost allowances (CCA) for several types of capital equipment and the tax 
treatment of cross-border interest deductibility. Estimating the cost of accelerated CCA provisions 
is difficult because such measures have a variable impact on revenues over time: for investment in a 
given year, revenues initially decline, but once the tax allowance is exhausted, revenue rises relative 
16 
This terminology was adopted by the Office of the Auditor General in its 2015 audit of the management of tax expenditures 
by Finance Canada and the Canada Revenue Agency. Following the audit, Finance Canada revamped its tax expenditures 
report. Among other changes, tax measures are now classified as structural and non-structural.
8to the baseline calculated using regular CCA. The revenue increase is offset by revenue losses 
arising from investment in subsequent years. For example, the cost of the accelerated CCA for most 
machinery and equipment (M&E) assets used in manufacturing announced in the 2015 budget 
was projected to peak at $360 million in its second full year.17 Quebec is the only jurisdiction that 
includes estimates of the tax revenue forgone from accelerated CCA in its tax expenditure report. 
TABLE 1 SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF TAX EXPENDITURE REPORTING
Available  
starting in: Included Taxes Documentation Digital Format
Federal 1999 Income and  the GST Measures well described, including a history 
of policy changes; objectives clearly stated; 
estimates for multiple years in each report.
From 2010
B.C. 1999 Income, retail sales, fuel and property Descriptions of measures not provided; 
estimates for a single year in each report.
No
Alberta 2013 Income and fuel Descriptions of measures not provided; 
estimates for a single year in each report.
No
Ontario 2005 Income, retail/HST, excise, mining, health and 
property
Measures well described in a separate 
document; estimates for a single year in each 
report.
No
Quebec 1996 Income, value-added, excise, capital and 
health
Measures well described, including some 
history of policy changes; estimates for 
multiple years in each report.
No
Canada’s tax treatment of cross-border interest expense make it possible to obtain two interest 
deductions for debt incurred to finance outbound investment, one in Canada and another in the host 
country.18 An illustrative calculation suggests that the amount of tax revenue forgone as a result of 
this incentive is substantial, likely around $2.5 billion for the federal government and an additional 
$1.5 to $2 billion for provincial governments in 2014.19 These costs are not included in the estimates 
of tax-based spending because there is not enough information available to calculate the cost to 
specific provinces. 
The federal government does not publish estimates of the tax revenue forgone through excise taxes 
or through preferential employment-insurance contribution rates. This study includes the cost of the 
hiring credit for small business introduced in 2011 and the small-business job credit implemented 
in 2014. Cost estimates were taken from budget documents. 
In the B.C. reports, the criterion for including a tax measure as a tax expenditure is that it be a 
reasonably close substitute for program spending. B.C. Treasury officials have the view that the 
small business deduction (or the special low rate for small business) does not meet this criterion. 
Nevertheless, Treasury officials provided an estimate for 2013, which was used to develop estimates 
for other years. The cost per percentage point of gap between the regular and small-business rates 
was applied to the gap in other years and then adjusted for growth in provincial output.
As mentioned above, refundable tax credits have been included in program spending in all 
jurisdictions since 2012. Nevertheless, refundable tax credits are also included for information 
purposes in most tax expenditure reports, the exception being Ontario. 
3.3. Government business enterprises
The financial reporting entity of the federal government includes all entities that it controls. This 
includes Crown corporations, other government business enterprises and a number of not-for-
17 Department of Finance Budget 2015, page 440.
18 
For additional detail, see Lester (2017b)
19 The federal measure affects provincial tax bases.
9profit organizations. If the controlled entity requires ongoing financial support from the federal 
government to fund its operations, its financial activities are included on a line-by-line basis in 
the government’s consolidated financial reports. If the controlled enterprise is substantially self-
sustaining after a block of government equity investment or loans, only the government’s share of 
profits and interest received on loans are included in government revenues.
TABLE 2  IMPLICIT SUBSIDIES PROVIDED BY GOVERNMENT BUSINESS ENTERPRISES SUPPLYING FINANCIAL 
SERVICES (2014-15 FISCAL YEAR, IN MILLIONS OF $)
  Federal Investment Gross Financial Return Implicit Subsidy2
  Equity Loans Total
Opportunity 
Cost of  
Investment1
Interest 
Received Net Income Total
Business Development Bank 4,775 15,683 20,458 1,688 127 491 618 1,070 
Farm Credit Canada 4,855 22,764 27,619 2,279 214 904 1,118 1,161 
Export Development Canada 8,527 8 8,535 704 - 1,416 1,416 -712
1. Calculated as the social opportunity cost of capital (10 per cent) times the total federal investment.
2. The opportunity cost of capital less the gross financial return. 
Most of the self-sustaining GBEs provide goods or services to private sector firms. The subsidy 
provided to these firms is the difference between the rate of return on the GBE’s capital and the 
social opportunity cost of that capital. Consider, for example, the Business Development Bank of 
Canada (BDC). In 2014–15, the value of the government’s investment (equity and debt) was $20.5 
billion (Table 2). The social opportunity cost of this investment is estimated at $1.7 billion.20 The 
gross financial return on BDC’s capital is about $600 million, which results in an implicit subsidy 
of about $1.4 billion to the firms benefiting from BDC’s financial services.21 Applying the same 
methodology to Farm Credit Canada, the implicit subsidy is about $1.2 billion. In contrast, the 
financial return on capital employed by Export Development Canada (EDC) exceeds the social 
opportunity cost of capital by about $700 million. Further, the result for the 2014–15 fiscal year is 
not an aberration. On average over the last 10 years, the financial return on EDC’s capital exceeded 
the opportunity cost by about $300 million. As a result, no subsidy arising from EDC is included in 
this report.
GBEs also provide subsidies by selling or purchasing specific goods or services at preferential 
prices. For example, the Ontario Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) and Hydro-
Québec make selective price reductions for large industrial users. The subsidies provided are 
substantial in Quebec but relatively small in Ontario (Table 3). B.C. and Ontario have made 
commitments to increase the share of electricity generated by renewable sources: “run-of-river” 
hydro-electricity, solar, wind and biomass. Both governments purchase renewables-sourced 
electricity from independent power producers under long-term contracts. Ontario does not use a 
competitive process to select suppliers, which raises the concern that the price paid is higher than 
production costs. If so, this would amount to a subsidy to the renewable-electricity-generating 
sector.22 The auditor general of Ontario estimates that the wind and solar energy contracts signed 
20 
The nominal social opportunity cost of capital is assumed to be 8.25 per cent. This estimate is based on analysis by  Jenkins 
and Kuo (2007), adjusted to reflect more recent analysis by the Bank of Canada. See Lester (2017a) for details.
21 An alternative estimate of the subsidy can be calculated as the difference between the rate of return obtained by BDC 
and private sector financial intermediaries. Applying an approach developed by Bergevin and Poschmann (2013), the cost 
advantage of the BDC relative to banks in its Financing Program is about $950 million. See Lester (2017a).
22 Note that although the cost of producing electricity using renewable sources is higher than using other sources, this does 
not amount to a subsidy. The Ontario government has chosen to diversify its supply in order to help achieve environmental 
goals.
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between 2009 and 2015 cost $9.2 billion more over the 20-year life of the contracts than if a 
competitive bidding process had been used. (Auditor General of Ontario, 2015: 214) 23 In other 
words, the amount paid will exceed production costs by an average of $460 million a year from 
2009 to 2028. 
TABLE 3  SUBSIDIES PROVIDED BY GOVERNMENT BUSINESS ENTERPRISES SUPPLYING ELECTRICITY 
(2014-15 FISCAL YEAR)
Large Industrial Users
Cents per Kwh GigaWatt Hours 
Sold
Subsidy 
 $ MillionsGeneral Rate Preferential Rate Subsidy Rate
Hydro Québec - Special Contracts1 4.81 3.64 1.17 24,377 285
Ontario IESO2 - Industrial Energy Incentive Program Variable 4.29 922 39
Ontario IESO2 - Renewable Energy Contracts3   460
1. Largely for aluminium producers, but also includes data centres.
2. Independent Electricity System Operator
3. Based on analysis by the Ontario auditor general. See text for details.
Sources: Hydro Québec Distribution Annual Report 2015, Tables 1 and 4; IESO response to access to information request.
Recommendations to improve reporting of business subsidies
1. The federal government gets high marks for transparency in reporting business subsidies. Even better results 
would be obtained with two changes. First, information on spending programs presented in the public accounts 
should identify subsidies received by business at the program level rather than the department/agency level. 
Amounts received by business received both directly and indirectly through other levels of government and 
non-profit organizations should be identified. Second, the coverage of tax expenditures should be expanded to 
include excise taxes.
2. Quebec also gets high marks for transparency, with the exception of its spending by special funds. A 
substantial fraction of subsidies is delivered through special funds, which are similar to federal agencies such 
as the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, but details of spending by these funds is not always publicly 
available. Quebec should also consider publishing its tax expenditure data in digital format. 
3. Ontario presents substantial information on spending by program, but does not identify subsidy recipients by 
class: persons, businesses, non-profit entities and other levels of government. Tax expenditure estimates should 
be presented for multiple years and revised as new data become available. Publication in digital format should 
also be considered. Finally, not enough information is publicly available to determine the cost of preferential 
electricity rates for select industrial users or the cost of purchasing electricity generated from wind and solar 
power. 
4. The B.C. public accounts should also identify subsidy recipients by class. Tax expenditure estimates should 
be presented for multiple years, preferably in digital format. B.C. should also expand the coverage of tax 
expenditure reporting to include measures targeted at specific industries or activities, even if they do not meet 
the criterion of being reasonably close substitutes for program spending. 
5. Alberta gets a failing grade on transparency in reporting business subsidies. Alberta’s public accounts report 
only the aggregate value of subsidies by ministry and documentation of programs is sparse. Meeting minimum 
standards for transparency requires documenting programs and publishing estimates of subsidies by program. 
Tax expenditure estimates should be published for multiple years, preferably in digital format.
23 
The report states that, in 2014, the IESO purchased wind-based electricity at double the market price and 3.5 times the 
market price for solar energy.
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4. SNAPSHOT OF BUSINESS SUBSIDIES IN 2014–15
This section presents and compares business subsidies for the 2014–15 fiscal year, the most recent 
year that data are available for all five jurisdictions. In this section, I compare overall subsidy 
levels, delivery methods, and targeting by sector and activity. I also present a classification of 
subsidies by rationale for intervention.
4.1. Delivery methods and targeting
In 2014–15, the federal government provided approximately $14 billion in business subsidies, or 
about $390 per person. Subsidies in the four largest provinces amounted to $14.6 billion, averaging 
about $480 per capita. These measures have to be financed by higher taxes or by reduced spending 
on other programs. Federal and provincial subsidies combined represented almost half of corporate 
income tax revenue, seven per cent of total tax revenues and 5.2 per cent of program spending in 
the five jurisdictions.
FIGURE 1 BUSINESS SUBSIDIES RELATIVE TO TAX REVENUE AND POPULATION
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FIGURE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS SUBSIDIES BY DELIVERY INSTRUMENT
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Expressed relative to GDP, business subsidies were highest in Quebec at 1.2 per cent. The share 
in the other jurisdictions varied in a narrow range around 0.75 per cent. In contrast, business 
subsidies expressed both relative to population and tax revenue were highest in Alberta (Chart 1), 
reflecting a high level of GDP per capita and a low aggregate tax ratio.24 Per capita subsidies were 
about 15 per cent lower in Quebec and were 35 to 40 per cent lower in the other three jurisdictions 
than in Alberta. B.C. had the lowest level of subsidies per capita and relative to program spending. 
Subsidies in B.C. were the second lowest relative to GDP. 
The tax system is the preferred instrument for delivering subsidies in all jurisdictions except 
Quebec, with the share ranging from just under half federally to about two-thirds in B.C. (Chart 
2). In Quebec, about half of business subsidies are delivered through spending programs, although 
refundable tax credits account for about 85 per cent of this spending. Across all jurisdictions, about 
15 per cent of subsidies were delivered through government business enterprises (GBEs). B.C. 
stands out with only about four per cent of subsidies delivered through GBEs. Only Ontario and the 
federal government subsidized businesses by taking an equity position (e.g., investing in General 
Motors) or directly making loans at concessionary rates.
Subsidies are highly concentrated by sector in all jurisdictions except Quebec (Chart 3). In 
jurisdictions other than Quebec, small businesses25 receive at least 40 per cent of subsidies, which 
24 
The relationship between per capita and GDP measures breaks down for Alberta because GDP per capita is 74- to 100-per-
cent higher in Alberta than in the other three provinces. The high capital intensity of oil production is an important 
contributor to this result. Alberta has by far the lowest ratio of tax revenue to GDP among the jurisdictions included in the 
comparison: 5.6 per cent compared to an average of 11.1 per cent. Tax revenue excludes mineral royalties.
25 
Small business is generally defined as those businesses qualifying for the small business deduction. At the federal level, 
firms with less than $10 million in assets qualify for a reduced tax rate on $500,000 of active business income. Provincial 
governments have similar qualification criteria.
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is high relative to the small-business share of investment and economy-wide wages.26 Agriculture 
accounts for a particularly large share of subsidies provided by Alberta, boosting the subsidy share 
of small business and agriculture to 79 per cent. The federal government allocates about two-thirds 
of subsidies to small business and agriculture. In B.C., the combined share of small business and 
exports — primarily support for foreign location shooting of films and videos, which is an export 
of services — is 76 per cent. In Ontario, small business, agriculture and manufacturing accounted 
for just over half of business subsidies in 2014–15. Although less concentrated than in other 
jurisdictions, three sectors in Quebec — small business, agriculture, information and e-commerce 
— account for 46 per cent of total subsidies.
FIGURE 3 DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS SUBSIDIES BY SECTOR 2014-15
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A small number of programs account for a large share of business subsidies in all jurisdictions. 
The top-five share ranges from about half in Ontario and Quebec to almost 90 per cent in B.C. 
The small business deduction is the largest program in all jurisdictions except Quebec, where it 
is second to the Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) incentive program 
(Table 4). SR&ED incentives were in the top three in all jurisdictions except Alberta, where 
they ranked fourth. Other programs making it into the top five in at least three jurisdictions are 
agricultural insurance programs and the lifetime capital gains exemption for small-business shares. 
Tables showing the most important programs in each jurisdiction are presented in Annex 2.
26 
Information presented in Finance Canada’s 2013 Tax Expenditure Report (Chart 7) suggests that small business accounts 
for about 15 per cent of capital investment by corporations and just over a quarter of wages and salaries paid by corporations 
in Canada.
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TABLE 4 RANKING OF KEY SUBSIDY PROGRAMS IN 2014–15
Federal B.C. Alberta Ontario Quebec
Small business deduction 1 1 1 1 2
Electricity produced by solar and wind power - - - 2 -
SR&ED incentives (all firms) 2 3 4 3 1
Agriculture insurance programs 5 >10 2 >10 3
Lifetime capital gains exemption 6 5 5 5 >10
 
Subsidies are also concentrated by activity in most jurisdictions. General measures reducing the 
cost of capital or current expenses account for 63 to 80 per cent of business subsidies in Alberta, 
Ontario and B.C. (Chart 4).27 In contrast, these general measures accounted for about 30 per cent of 
federal business subsidies. Measures supporting R&D and innovation accounted for about a quarter 
of subsidies provided by the federal and Quebec governments, but only four to 11 per cent in the 
other jurisdictions. Support for financing is also relatively more important federally and in Quebec 
than in other provinces. The federal government allocates a larger share of its subsidies, nine 
per cent, to promoting entrepreneurship than do other jurisdictions. Alberta allocates an above-
average share, almost 20 per cent, of its subsidies to providing income support through subsidized 
insurance and direct payments to farmers. Measures promoting regional development represent 
a small share of total subsidies in all jurisdictions and only the federal and Ontario governments 
provided a small amount of transitional assistance to industry in 2014–15. 
FIGURE 4 DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS SUBSIDIES BY ACTIVITY – 2014-15
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27 The largest program reducing capital costs is the small business deduction. The largest program subsidizing current costs is 
the federal job credit, which reduces employment insurance contributions by small business.
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4.2. Classification of subsidy programs by rationale
I have reviewed the subsidies offered by governments and classified them by the rationale, explicit 
or implicit, for intervention (Chart 5). The motivations for intervention identified earlier comprise 
market failures due to externalities and capital market imperfections, industrial policy, tax policy 
efficiency and income support. I have also divided income-support measures into explicit and 
implicit subcategories; if a measure does not fit into any of the other categories, then its implicit 
objective is to transfer income.
There are numerous grey areas in classifying programs. For example, the rationale for the small 
business deduction, which is the largest subsidy program in all jurisdictions except Quebec, is 
to mitigate a capital-market failure. However, while there is general agreement that young and 
innovative firms have difficulty accessing capital, there is no consensus that all small firms have 
difficulty accessing external financing. Nevertheless, I have included the small business deduction 
in the capital-market-failure category. This point also applies to lending by Farm Credit Canada 
and the Business Development Bank’s Financing Program, which supports small and medium-
sized business. Classifying programs as contributing to an industrial policy also raises some issues. 
Measures targeted at specific industries known to pay relatively high wages would qualify. On 
the other hand, while the manufacturing sector pays above-average wages, there is considerable 
variance within the sector. 28 Nevertheless, I have included measures providing support to the overall 
manufacturing sector, partly on the grounds that policy-makers believe, or believed, such programs 
to be growth-enhancing.
Considering all five jurisdictions, about 70 per cent of subsidies by value address a market failure, 
promote high-wage, high-productivity industries, or improve the efficiency of the tax system. 
In other words, 70 per cent of business subsidies meet the necessary condition for improving 
economic performance or promoting economic development. Note, however, that if the small 
business deduction is excluded, this ratio falls to about 45 per cent and if industrial policy measures 
are excluded, it falls to 38 per cent.
Capital-market failures dominate the motivation for intervention by the federal government, B.C. 
and Alberta (Chart 5). Subsidies are distributed substantially more uniformly in Quebec and 
Ontario. At the federal level, the subsidies provided by Farm Credit Canada and the Business 
Development Bank along with the small business deduction, are the key programs addressing 
capital-market failures. The Business Development Bank provides conventional and high-risk loans 
to small and medium-sized business as well as risk-capital financing for innovative firms. Alberta 
and Quebec also provide subsidized loans to farmers. All provincial governments have a number of 
small programs supporting the risk-capital market. 
Externalities, where the case for government intervention is strong, account for about a quarter 
of federal subsidies. In the other jurisdictions, this share ranges from nine per cent (Alberta) to 16 
per cent (Quebec). Federal and provincial incentives for SR&ED are the key measures addressing 
externalities, although a number of other programs promoting the development of energy-saving 
technology and clean energy are included, as are labour-market training incentives. 
Measures implemented to promote tax efficiency account for 10 per cent of federal subsidies, 
approximately double the share in other jurisdictions. The key measures in this category are the 
lifetime capital gains exemptions for small-business shares and farming and fishing property and 
flow-through shares for mineral exploration. 
About two per cent of federal subsidies could be viewed as implementing an industrial strategy to 
promote high-wage, high-productivity industries. The three top beneficiaries were the aerospace 
28 
Over the five years ending in 2015, the average weekly wage in manufacturing was 12.5-per-cent higher than the all-
industry average. However, about 40 per cent of the 21 three-digit industries making up the manufacturing sector paid 
wages below the all-industry average. 
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industry, film and video production services and the auto sector. Alberta does even less of this 
type of targeting than the federal government does, but the other provinces are substantially more 
active. All jurisdictions promote the film and video production services industry, which accounts 
for a quarter of subsidies in this category. Ontario, Quebec and B.C. promote the “digital media” 
industry; subsidies to that industry account for about a seventh of total industrial policy subsidies. 
Ontario and Quebec also provide general support for the manufacturing industry, which pays 
above-average wages. Quebec offers preferential electricity rates to selected large industrial users, 
primarily in the aluminum industry, but data centres are growing in importance. 
Measures with the more-or-less explicit objective of providing income support, including regional 
development programs and transitional assistance, account for 14 to 19 per cent of subsidies in all 
jurisdictions except B.C., where the share is less than two per cent. Agricultural programs dominate 
this category, accounting for almost two-thirds of the total. 
FIGURE 5 DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS SUBSIDIES BY RATIONALE 2014-15
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The remaining subsidies do not address market failures, do not promote tax efficiency, do not support 
high-wage, high-productivity industries and do not have an explicit equity objective. The share of 
these programs in total subsidies ranges from around 10 per cent at the federal level and in B.C. to 
almost 30 per cent in Ontario. The key programs in Ontario are purchases of electricity generated 
from renewable sources,29 fuel-excise-tax exemptions and electricity-rate reductions for small 
business. The key programs in Quebec are general subsidy programs provided by Investissement 
Québec, tax credits for contributions to a labour-sponsored investment fund, property tax refunds 
for farmers and excise-fuel-tax exemptions. In Alberta, fuel excise tax exemptions account for about 
three-quarters of the subsidies in the implicit-income-support category.
29 
This program is not addressing a market failure. The subsidy, calculated from a multi-year estimate presented in the 2015 
report of the auditor general of Ontario, represents the premium paid over competitively priced renewable energy. It is 
therefore a subsidy provided to the renewable-energy sector. The extra cost incurred by purchasing electricity produced 
from renewable sources at market prices instead of a cheaper non-renewable source could be interpreted as a business 
subsidy implemented to address a market failure. That possibility is not investigated in this report. 
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5. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Recent developments suggest that the level of business subsidies will remain relatively stable until 
the 2018 fiscal year in B.C. and Quebec. Increases in the six- to eight-per-cent range are likely in 
Ontario and at the federal level. Increases in Alberta will be more substantial, particularly when 
measured on an accrual basis. 
Quebec announced cutbacks to business subsidies delivered through the tax system in its 2014 
budget. These measures, along with an increase in the eligibility threshold for R&D tax credits, 
were estimated to reduce subsidies by about $375 million in 2015–16 and $475 million in 2016–17. 
They were, however, offset by about $75 million (2015–16 ) and $100 million (2016–17) in new 
initiatives, including a tax-rate reduction for manufacturing SMEs and a holiday from contributions 
to the health services fund for all SMEs. Further, the 2016 budget announced business-support 
initiatives costing about $300 million in 2016–17. These new initiatives target manufacturing, 
small business, innovative startups and innovation in selected sectors. They also promote the 
government’s digital strategy. The net result is a reduction in business subsidies of about $300 
million in 2015–16 and $100 million in 2016–17. These changes represent about seven and two 
per cent of the level of business subsidies in 2014–15. Increased funding for Plan Nord, Quebec’s 
northern development fund, may further reduce the savings. The 2017 budget announced new 
measures amounting to about $175 million, which should leave the overall level of business 
subsidies in 2017–18 close to their level in 2014–15.
In B.C., new initiatives in the 2015 and 2016 budgets raised business subsidies by about $20 million 
in 2015–16 and about $35 million in 2016–17. The 2016–17 increase is, however, approximately 
offset by reductions to credits for foreign location shooting of films and the digital-animation 
and visual-effects tax credit that took effect halfway through the fiscal year. The full-year effect 
in 2017–18 would result in a net reduction of about $35 million. B.C. also introduced a new 
venture capital fund, the B.C. Tech Fund, that focuses on emerging technology companies in 
B.C., primarily in information and communications technology, digital media, clean tech and life 
science/health care. The size of the subsidy provided will be small. There were no new measures 
announced in the 2017 budget or the update presented in September 2017.
There is likely to be a sizable net increase in federal subsidies arising from actions taken since the 
2014 budget. The key measures in 2015 were introduction of the small-business job credit, a two-
percentage-point reduction in the small-business corporate income tax rate, phased in over four years, 
and accelerated capital cost allowances for machinery and equipment used in manufacturing. These 
measures would have increased business subsidies by about $300 million in 2015–16 and about $600 
million in 2016–17, although only the small-business tax rate was a completely new initiative. The 
2016 federal budget restricted the reduction in the small-business tax rate to 0.5 percentage points but 
introduced a number of new measures costing approximately $100 million in 2016–17. The increases 
in 2015–16 and 2016–17 represent approximately two per cent and 4.5 per cent, respectively, of 
federal business subsidies in 2014–15. The 2017 budget announced a large number of new initiatives, 
many of which were reallocations of existing funding. New funding amounted to about $180 million 
for the 2018 fiscal year, bringing the increase relative to fiscal 2015 to about six per cent. The Fall 
Economic Statement announced that the small-business tax rate would be reduced by a further 1.5 
percentage points, starting in 2018. The federal government has also announced substantial increases 
in funding for the Business Development Bank to facilitate financing of innovative companies, but 
the subsidy involved is likely to be around $25 million a year. 
The Ontario government launched a systematic review of program spending in its 2015 budget. 
The objective was to avoid across-the-board spending cuts during a period of fiscal consolidation. 
All program spending was to be reviewed to identify programs that are not achieving their 
objectives, no longer consistent with government priorities or no longer serving a clear public 
interest. With respect to business subsidies, the review has resulted in reductions in the generosity 
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of the tax credits for apprenticeship training, interactive digital media, foreign location shooting 
and computer-assisted special effects. Total savings in 2015–16 and 2016–17 are $80 million and 
$160 million respectively. The intention is to use some of these savings to finance similar but more 
effective programs. Ontario also announced a new 10-year jobs and prosperity fund in 2015, with 
total funding of $2.7 billion. Spending from the fund in each of the 2016 and 2017 fiscal years 
was about $175 million. A number of small-business support measures were announced in the 
2016 budget while the 2017 budget announced new measures costing about $140 million. The net 
impact on business subsidies appears to have been small in the 2016 and 2017 fiscal years, but more 
substantial in 2018, amounting to $400 to $500 million, which would be about 7.5 per cent of the 
level of business subsidies in 2014–15. 
Alberta made commitments to increase business subsidies substantially in an October 2015 fiscal 
update and in the 2016 budget, collectively referred to as the Alberta Jobs Plan. The Jobs Plan 
allocates an additional $150 million in 2016–17 and 2017–18 to business subsidies. Two new tax 
credits were introduced. The Alberta Investor Tax Credit encourages the supply of capital to 
small firms operating in technology-intensive sectors. The Capital Investment Tax Credit is a 
10-per-cent non-refundable credit for capital investment, capped at $5 million per claim. These 
two measures are expected to cost $29 million and $42 million, respectively, in 2017. Additional 
funding was provided for the Alberta Enterprise Corporation, regional development initiatives 
and apprenticeships and training. The government also reduced the small-business tax rate from 
three per cent to two per cent, which is expected to reduce revenues by $45 million in 2016–17 
and $175 million in 2017–18. The largest commitments, however, are for increases that will take 
place in four to five years. Under the petro-chemicals diversification fund, $500 million in royalty 
credits were made available for investing in facilities producing methanol and plastics. The fund is 
fully committed and the credits will be claimed when the two subsidized facilities start production 
in 2021. No new subsidies were announced in the 2017 budget. Business subsidies amounted to 
$2.6 billion in 2014–15. The additional spending in fiscal 2018 represents about 12.5 per cent of 
the 2014–15 level; the liability incurred by the petro-chemicals diversification fund raises this 
percentage to 31 per cent.
6. LONGER-RUN PERSPECTIVE ON BUSINESS-SUBSIDY PROGRAMS
The availability of data on tax expenditures is the key constraint on presenting longer-run 
comparisons of business subsidies by jurisdiction. The federal government, Quebec and B.C. have 
published tax expenditure estimates since at least 1999, but the Ontario estimates are available 
starting in 2005 and Alberta only began publishing tax expenditure estimates in 2013. As a result, 
I compare the evolution of business subsidies provided by the federal, B.C., Ontario and Quebec 
governments over the 10-year period ending in 2014–15.
Measured in real per capita terms, the federal government and Quebec increased business subsidies 
during the economic downturn and reduced them substantially thereafter (Chart 6). Over the 10 
years ending in 2014–15, federal real per capita business subsidies rose $130 to 2010–11 but fell 
$170 over the following four years, resulting in a net decline of nine per cent. In Quebec, real per 
capita subsidies rose $260 by 2011–12 and then fell $150 by 2014–15, leaving them 25-per-cent 
higher at the end of the 10-year period. In contrast, real business subsidies rose strongly in Ontario 
until 2012–13 and fell only slightly thereafter, leaving them 43 per cent higher at the end of the 
period. Real per capita subsidies were stable in B.C. from 2006–07 to 2011–12, but increased by 
almost a quarter in the following three years. 
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FIGURE 6  EVOLUTION OF BUSINESS SUBSIDIES IN QUEBEC, ONTARIO, B.C. AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
(2014$ PER CAPITA)
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The net increase in Ontario subsidies over the 10-year period was approximately $2.1 billion (in 
2014 dollars). However, a substantial number of programs were either scaled back or eliminated 
during the 10 years, causing the sum of the absolute changes to reach $4.2 billion. Agricultural-
support payments accounted for about a fifth of the summed absolute changes, but the net change 
in agricultural spending over the period was close to zero. A further 35 per cent of the gross 
change can be explained by developments in eight programs. Economic growth and changes in 
program parameters increased the real cost of the small business deduction by about $525 million. 
The largest new program was the purchase, at above-market prices, of electricity produced from 
renewable sources. Based on analysis by the Ontario auditor general (2015), the annual cost of this 
program will be about $450 million a year from 2009 to 2017. Provision of transitional support to 
General Motors and introduction of the Ontario R&D Tax Credit each added about $175 million 
to subsidy payments. Implementation of the Northern Electricity Rate Program, the Clean Energy 
Benefit for small business and additional support for the horse-racing industry each accounted for 
an additional $100 million in subsidy payments. Outside of agricultural programs, the only sizable 
cutback was a reduction in the excise tax exemption for fuels, which lowered subsidies by $300 
million over the 10-year period. 
Subsidies in B.C. rose approximately $370 million (2014 dollars) over their 2006–07 to 2011–12 
average in the three years ending in 2014–15. Enrichment of the small business deduction and the 
tax credit for foreign location shooting along with increased take-up of the mining exploration tax 
credit account for all of the increase.30 
In Quebec, the real value of subsidies rose $1.9 billion from 2005-06 to 2011-12. However, a 
substantial number of programs were either scaled back or eliminated during this period, so the sum 
of the absolute changes by program was almost $3 billion. The largest change arose from enrichment 
30 
The mining exploration tax-credit rate was also increased from 20 per cent to 30 per cent for exploration activities 
undertaken in areas affected by the pine beetle infestation.
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of the small business deduction, which increased the real cost of subsidies by $475 million. 
Substantial changes to agricultural-support programs resulted in a net increase in payments of $360 
million. Increased lending by Investissement Québec31 added $270 million to the cost of business 
subsidies. Quebec introduced two large programs over the 10 years: the Economic Development 
Fund, a general development program, and a refundable tax credit promoting the development of 
e-business. These programs added about $440 million and $310 million, respectively, to the cost of 
subsidies. Quebec reduced measured subsidies by about $320 million when preferences available 
under the capital tax were eliminated along with the tax itself in 2012–13. 
The net decline in Quebec’s real business subsidies from their peak in 2011–12 to 2014–15 was $1.1 
billion. The sum of the absolute changes by program was about $200-million higher. The declines 
were broad-based, but three measures made a substantial contribution. The subsidy arising from 
the lending activities of Investissement Québec fell approximately $225 million over the three 
years. Hydro Québec subsidies provided to large industrial users, largely aluminum producers, 
declined a similar amount. And the subsidy provided for the construction of forest-access roads 
declined $150 million. Quebec’s 2014–15 budget announced a 20-per-cent cut in most tax-based 
business subsidies and the elimination or the reduction in the generosity of several others. Savings 
in 2014–15 were estimated at about $150 million. 
The real value of federal business subsidies rose $5.2 billion from 2005–06 to 2010–11 but virtually 
the same amount in the following four years. Increases in the financing subsidies provided by the 
Business Development Bank and Farm Credit Canada32 each accounted for about a quarter of the 
rise. Increased generosity of the small business deduction and higher agricultural income-support 
payments each contributed 13 per cent to the upswing to 2010–11. The largest contributors to the 
subsequent decline were the small business deduction (26 per cent), declining agricultural-support 
payments (nine per cent) and lower SR&ED investment tax credits (six per cent), reflecting reduced 
activity and policy changes. Notable increases during the period of overall decline came from 
the hiring/job tax credit implemented in 2012, new Quebec regional development subsidies, also 
implemented in 2012, and losses on the equity investment in General Motors. 
A small number of programs experienced substantial and sustained changes over the 10-year 
period. The real value of flow-through shares declined almost 70 per cent ($360 million), and the 
real value of the Atlantic investment tax credit fell approximately by half, or $250 million, largely 
due to reduced take-up, although access by the oil and gas industry was restricted in 2014 and 
eliminated in 2016. Payments to Bombardier to support the C Series were eliminated, for a saving 
of about $190 million, and payments under the SR&ED tax incentive fell $170 million, reflecting 
policy changes and lower take-up in recent years. The Technology Partnerships Canada program 
was also eliminated, for a saving of $330 million, but was effectively replaced by the Strategic 
Aerospace and Defence Initiative with spending of $173 million in 2014–15. The lifetime capital 
gains exemption for farming and fishing property rose by three-quarters over the period ($225 
million), largely reflecting a series of enrichments to the measure.33
The way federal subsidies were delivered changed substantially from 2001–02 to 2014–15 (Chart 
7). Two changes are notable. First, the share of spending programs rose almost 20 percentage 
points in 2003–04, largely due to increased agricultural income-support payments. Second, after 
roughly covering the social costs of their lending activities up to 2006–07, the federal Business 
Development Bank (BDC) and Farm Credit Canada began providing subsidized financing. This 
31 
Investissement Québec was created in 2011, but represents a continuation of the Société générale de financement, which was 
active in 2005–06.
32 For both the Business Development Bank and Farm Credit Canada, the subsidy provided was near zero in 2005–06 and 
2006–07.
33 Fishing property was added in 2006 and the lifetime limit was increased in 2007 from $500,000 to $750,000 and to 
$800,000 in 2013. See Finance Canada (2016)
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shift coincided with a huge increase in government funding: government investment in BDC rose 
from $1.8 billion in 2007 to $15.9 billion in 2011. BDC’s financing activity rose at a slower but still 
rapid pace: the $4.5-billion increase represented a 40-per-cent rise over 2007 levels. These two 
changes resulted in a decline in the share of tax measures from about 80 per cent to about 45 per 
cent over the 14-year period.
FIGURE 7 FEDERAL BUSINESS SUBSIDIES – DISTRIBUTION BY DELIVERY INSTRUMENT
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7. ASSESSMENT OF SOME KEY PROGRAMS
Classifying subsidy programs by rationale is a useful starting point for an evaluation exercise. 
If governments intervene to correct market failures, to support high-wage, high-productivity 
industries or to improve the efficiency of the tax system, the expectation is that better economic 
performance will result. However, since government intervention is costly, there may or may not 
be a net economic benefit. Evaluating programs in these categories therefore requires a rigorous 
assessment of their economic costs and benefits. The key cost of providing most business subsidies 
arises from the increase in taxes required to finance the measures. Higher taxes have unavoidable 
adverse impacts on incentives to work, save and invest that harm economic performance. When 
governments fund separate entities to provide services, however, the key consideration is the 
social cost of the capital invested. In all cases, governments spend money to administer subsidy 
programs and firms incur costs to comply with program requirements. Supporting high-wage, high-
productivity industries can result in foreign retaliation or the use of similar subsidies, which is likely 
to put downward pressure on output prices. As a result, there could be a transfer of tax revenue (part 
or all of the subsidy) to foreigners, which would make the policy particularly expensive. 
As stated earlier, income-support programs involve a trade-off between equity and efficiency. For 
these programs, a useful evaluation technique is to compare the economic costs imposed by the 
program to some measure of the change in equity. That is, it can be informative to calculate the 
economic cost per dollar of income transferred for various programs.
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In this section, I summarize published evaluations that I have performed of business subsidies for 
which a plausible case can be made that they will improve economic performance. An overview of 
the results is provided in Table 5. There are nine measures presented in the table, most of which are 
generic policies implemented by both the federal and provincial governments. These nine measures 
account for 80 per cent of all subsidies with the potential to improve economic performance, which 
in turn account for 70 per cent of all business subsidies provided by the federal government and the 
four largest provinces.
7.1. Small-business financing
The largest measure is the small business deduction, which accounts for 35 per cent of subsidies 
that could be expected to improve economic performance. The implicit objective of the small 
business deduction is to mitigate difficulties profitable small and medium-sized firms have 
accessing external financing, particularly bank loans. Eligible firms pay a reduced rate of tax on net 
income up to a certain limit, provided it is used to finance active business investment. In a recent 
study (Lester, 2017), I undertake a benefit-cost analysis of the small business deduction. While not 
all analysts agree that all small firms have difficulty accessing external financing, I assume that 
the reduction in the cost of capital arising from this measure improves the allocation of financial 
capital in the economy. The reduction in the cost of capital also increases the amount of investment 
in the economy. These benefits can be partially or completely offset by the cost of financing the 
small business deduction. If it is financed with higher taxes on larger firms, the net impact will 
be negative. With exactly offsetting impacts on investment by small and large firms, mitigation 
of the capital-market failure would in principle result in a small net economic benefit. However, 
small firms use both capital and labour less efficiently than larger firms do, and the resulting loss of 
efficiency causes a net decline in real income. If the small business deduction is financed by higher 
taxes on personal incomes or on purchases of goods and services, the net impact on real income 
will be positive. 
The federal Business Development Bank provides higher-risk loans to SMEs through its Financing 
Program. In 2014–15, the value of the Financing Program portfolio was $17.2 billion. In a recent 
paper (Lester 2017a), I undertake a benefit-cost analysis of this program assuming that the BDC is 
correcting a capital-market failure that causes banks to refuse credit to higher-risk borrowers. The 
benefit of correcting this market failure has to be set against the social cost of providing the loans, 
which is calculated using the methodology set out in Table 2. Capitalization by the government 
allows the BDC to provide loans to these borrowers at a lower interest rate than commercial banks. 
I estimate the potential reduction in interest rates to be about five per cent. Applied to the value of 
the loan portfolio and assuming none of BDC loans would have been underwritten by commercial 
banks, a reduction of that size implies a social benefit that is approximately a third of the social 
costs incurred by the BDC. Based on the updated estimates of the gross social cost of BDC 
operations shown in Table 2, the net social loss caused by the Financing Program is estimated at 
$730 million in 2014–15. 
Applying the same framework to loans made by Farm Credit Canada results in a social loss of 
$1.2 billion.
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TABLE 5  ASSESSMENT OF KEY BUSINESS-SUBSIDY PROGRAMS WITH THE POTENTIAL TO IMPROVE  
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
 
All Jurisdictions 2014-15
Rationale Impact on Real income Comments ReferenceProgram cost 
($M) % Share
1
Small Business 
Deduction 7,365 37.3%
Capital  
market failure Negative
Cost of shifting resources into smaller, less-efficient firms 
dominates the benefit of mitigating a capital market failure. Lester (2017a)
Business 
Development Bank – 
Small-firm financing
1,427 7.2% Capital  market failure Negative
Benefits of correcting the capital market failure are not 
large enough to offset the social cost of providing the loans, 
which is conceptually equivalent to the subsidy calculated 
in Table 2.
Lester (2017a)
Farm Credit Canada 
and provincial farm 
lending programs
1,851 9.4% Capital  market failure
Likely  
negative
The net social cost of capital employed likely exceeds the 
benefit of mitigating a capital market failure. This study
Federal regular 
SR&ED tax credit 
(large firms)
1,510 7.6% Externality Positive
Spillover benefits exceed the cost of financing the credit and 
the cost of administering and applying for the incentive. The 
credit rate is below the optimal level.
Lester 
(2012a)
Provincial SR&ED 
tax credits for  
large firms2
599 3.0% Externality Positive Combined federal-provincial credit rate remains below the optimal level.
Lester (forth-
coming)
Federal enhanced 
SR&ED tax credit 
(small firms)
1,290 6.5% Externality Negative
Excessive subsidization, high administration and compliance 
costs dominate spillover benefits. The credit rate exceeds its 
optimal level.
Lester 
(2012a)
Provincial SR&ED 
tax credits for  
small firms2
637 3.2% Externality Negative Provincial measures raise the subsidy rate further above its optimal level.  
Foreign location 
shooting of films 
and videos
612 3.1% Industrial policy Negative
The wage gap is not large enough to offset financing costs 
and the partial transfer of the subsidy to foreign producers. Lester (2013)
Capital gains 
exemption on  
sale of small-
business shares
1,222 6.2% Tax policy efficiency
Neutral to 
negative
If financed by an increase in small-business tax rates, the 
impact on investment, and hence real income, would be 
approximately neutral. If financed by a higher general 
corporate income tax rate there would be a real income loss.
Lester (2017a)
Subtotal 16,513 83.6%      
Subsidies with 
the potential to 
improve economic 
performance 
19,754        
All subsidies 28,574          
1. Share of subsidies with the potential to improve economic performance.
2. Estimated for Alberta and BC by applying the national share of small and large firms in performing R&D to the total cost of 
the credit. For Quebec, the information on shares was supplemented by the relative credit rates for large and small firms. 
7.2. Assistance for R&D
The federal government offers two tax credits for current expenditure on scientific research and 
experimental development: an “enhanced” 35-per-cent refundable credit for Canadian-controlled 
private corporations; and a 15-per-cent non-refundable or “regular” credit for other firms. In a 2012 
study (Lester 2012a), I reported that the regular credit generated a net social benefit amounting 
to about 10 cents per dollar of tax revenue forgone. The optimal credit rate — the value that 
maximizes the dollar value of the social benefit — was calculated at 23 per cent. In contrast, the 
same study found that the enhanced credit resulted in a social loss of about 12 cents per dollar 
of tax revenue forgone. The higher subsidy rate and higher compliance costs per dollar of credit 
received for smaller firms explain the different outcomes. The optimal credit rate for the enhanced 
credit — in this case, the value that minimizes the loss — was also estimated to be 23 per cent. 
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In a more recent study (Lester 2017a), I perform a simplified benefit-cost analysis of overall 
federal-provincial R&D investment tax credits. Note that among the provinces, only Ontario 
provides different rates by firm size. The federal-provincial weighted-average effective SR&ED 
statutory tax credit for SMEs was about 43 per cent in 2014.34 Since the federal rate is above the 
calculated optimal subsidy rate, overlaying provincial subsidies necessarily increases the social 
loss. In addition, provincial variations in credit rates harm economic efficiency by shifting R&D 
investment across provincial boundaries, although this impact was not captured in the simplified 
benefit-cost analysis. In contrast, since the federal regular credit rate is below its optimal value, 
provincial programs raise the net social benefit from investment tax credits. 
7.3. Foreign location shooting of films 
In a 2013 paper (Lester 2013), I performed a benefit-cost analysis of the film and video production 
services tax credits, often described as tax credits for foreign location shooting, provided by the 
federal government and most provincial governments. The benefits included in the analysis were 
the additional tax revenue collected on non-resident performers and production services workers, 
along with cost savings realized on domestic production of films and videos due to increased scale 
of the industry. These benefits were overwhelmed by the costs imposed by raising taxes to finance 
the incentive, the transfer of part of the subsidy to foreign producers and the loss of efficiency 
caused by using subsidies to shift capital and labour into the film and video industry. The loss 
associated with the transfer of tax revenue to foreign producers is unusually large because all of the 
subsidized output is exported. This large terms-of-trade loss is a key factor raising the overall net 
social loss to almost 100 per cent of the tax revenue forgone.
A number of rationales are given for subsidizing foreign location shooting of films and videos. For 
example, the objectives of Ontario’s program are to “attract investment, increase job creation and 
help build a high-value domestic film and television production sector.”35 The first two objectives 
could be claimed for any targeted incentive. Assuming market forces are sufficiently strong to 
allocate labour and capital to their most efficient uses, all such incentives would reduce real 
income, as was demonstrated by the benefit-cost analysis summarized above. 
The third objective — to create a high-value industry — implicitly rejects the assumption that 
capital and quality-adjusted labour earn the same return in all applications. As discussed in  
Section 2, there is evidence to support this view. However, while the necessary condition for 
industrial policy to be effective exists, government intervention is costly, so inter-industry 
differences in productivity would have to be substantial to realize a net benefit. In the case of the 
film-production-services industry, the productivity of labour and capital (total factor productivity) 
would have to be almost two-thirds higher than the all-industry average for the policy to generate a 
net social benefit. While estimates of total factor productivity by detailed industry are not available, 
such a large productivity advantage is highly unlikely given relative wages in a slightly more 
broadly defined industry. Statistics Canada data show that on average over the five years ending in 
2015, wages in the motion picture and video industry were approximately equal to the economy-
wide average.36
34 
Provincial tax credits are deducted from the base for the federal tax credit, so the federal-provincial effective rate is lower 
than the statutory rate.
35 
Quoted in “Report of the Expert Panel Examining Ontario’s Business Support Programs,” June 30, 2014.
36 
Cansim Table 281-0047.
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7.4. Capital gains exemptions on the sale of small-business shares
The federal and all provincial governments provide a lifetime limited exemption for capital gains 
realized on the sale of small-business shares. As discussed in Section 2, taxation of capital gains 
on business shares can give rise to double taxation. If an innovation raises expected profitability 
of a firm, both the increase in the value of the shares and the additional income arising from the 
innovation will be taxed. The partial effect of exempting the sale of small-business shares from 
capital gains taxation is therefore to raise economic efficiency by encouraging investment. 
This benefit should be compared to the cost of raising the tax revenue to finance the exemption. If 
the financing source is an increase in the tax rate applied to small-business income, the negative 
impact on investment would be approximately the same as the positive impact arising from the 
exemption. On the other hand, a plausible case can be made that the quality of the investment 
stimulated by the capital gains exemption would be higher than the investment lost through a 
higher income-tax rate. If the financing source is an increase in the general corporate income-tax 
rate, the net impact on investment would still be small, but the overall impact on efficiency would 
likely be negative for two reasons. First, the change in relative tax rates would shift capital from 
large firms to smaller, less-efficient firms. Second, a higher general corporate income-tax rate 
would induce international profit shifting out of Canada, so preserving revenue neutrality would 
involve a larger tax-rate increase than if the exemption is financed by raising the small-business 
tax rate. The net impact would be positive if the financing source is the personal-income or value-
added tax rate, but the corporate income tax is a more natural source of financing since it keeps the 
overall tax burden on capital constant.
Of the seven measures reviewed in this section that address a standard market failure, only two 
clearly improve economic outcomes. These two programs — federal and provincial support for 
R&D performed by larger firms — account for about 11 per cent of the total funding for programs 
that could reasonably be expected to improve economic performance. The five other programs fail 
a benefit-cost test because of relatively small benefits from correcting market failures, high costs 
of intervention or too-high subsidy rates. The single industrial policy measure considered fails 
a benefit-cost test because the wage gap in the subsidized industry is not large enough to offset 
the costs of providing the subsidy. Capital gains exemptions on the sale of small-business shares 
have at best a neutral impact on real income, assuming the source of financing is higher corporate 
income taxes. 
8. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented unique information on business subsidies in Canada. Considering all 
delivery methods — program spending, the tax system, direct investment and the activities of 
government business enterprises — subsidies at the federal level and the four largest provinces 
were about $870 per person. Surprisingly, per capita subsidies were highest in Alberta, which is 
also the least transparent in reporting subsidies. Further, recent announcements suggest that real 
per capita subsidies will grow at a faster pace in Alberta than in other jurisdictions. 
The analysis undertaken in this paper indicates that well over half of the spending on subsidies 
is of questionable value. About 70 per cent of spending on business subsidies is used to address 
market failures, to improve the trade-off between efficiency and protecting the revenue base when 
designing the tax system or to pursue industrial policy objectives. A plausible case can be made 
for expecting measures in these categories to raise real income. However, because government 
intervention is costly, at least two-thirds of spending in this category — or just under half of overall 
business subsidies — fails to improve economic performance. Another 11 per cent of subsidies 
have neither an explicit income objective nor a convincing efficiency rationale, which raises the 
share of questionable spending to almost 60 per cent of the total. 
26
ANNEX 1: DATA SOURCES FOR TAX EXPENDITURES
Finance Canada, Report on Federal Tax Expenditures — Concepts, Estimates and Evaluations 2016.  
(http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2016/taxexp16-eng.asp) 
Ministère des finances du Quebec, Dépenses fiscales 2015 (published only in French).  
http://www.finances.gouv.qc.ca/documents/autres/fr/AUTFR_DepensesFiscales2015.pdf
Ontario Finance Ministry, Transparency in Taxation 2015, available only online.  
http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/fallstatement/2015/transparency.html. 
Alberta Ministry of Finance, Fiscal Plan 2016-19, Tax Plan Annex.  
http://finance.alberta.ca/publications/budget/budget2016/fiscal-plan-complete.pdf.
B.C. Ministry of Finance, Budget and Fiscal Plan, Appendix A1.  
http://bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2015/bfp/2015_budget_and_fiscal_plan.pdf. 
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ANNEX 2: KEY PROGRAMS BY JURISDICTION
TABLE A1 TOP TEN BUSINESS-SUBSIDY PROGRAMS - FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2014-15
$ Millions Share of Total Cumulative share
Small business deduction 3,225 23.2% 23.2%
SR&ED incentive – all firms 2,800 20.1% 43.3%
Farm Credit Canada 1,161 8.3% 51.6%
Business Development Bank – SME financing 1,070 7.7% 59.3%
Farm income insurance programs 988 7.1% 66.4%
Capital gains exemption – small-business shares 590 4.2% 70.6%
Capital gains exemption – farm and fishing property 525 3.8% 74.4%
Hiring/job credit 320 2.3% 76.7%
Atlantic investment tax credit 225 1.6% 78.3%
Investment in GM 188 1.3% 79.6%
TABLE A2 TOP TEN BUSINESS-SUBSIDY PROGRAMS - BC 2014-15
$ Millions Share of Total Cumulative share
Small business deduction 976 54.4% 54.4%
Foreign location shooting of films and video 265 14.8% 69.1%
SR&ED incentive 140 7.8% 76.9%
Mining-exploration tax credit 104 5.8% 82.7%
Capital gains exemption-- small-business shares, farming and fishing property 69 3.8% 86.6%
Interactive digital media tax credit 37 2.1% 88.6%
Small-business venture capital tax credit 23 1.3% 89.9%
Tourism promotion (Destination BC) 23 1.3% 91.2%
International business activities tax refund 20 1.1% 92.3%
Low excise-tax rate for aviation fuel 20 1.1% 93.4%
TABLE A3 TOP TEN BUSINESS-SUBSIDY PROGRAMS - ALBERTA 2014-15
$ Millions Share of Total Cumulative share
Small business deduction 1,100 41.9% 41.9%
Farm income insurance programs 211 8.0% 49.9%
Farm financing programs 207 7.9% 57.8%
Excise-tax exemption for fuel 222 8.5% 66.2%
SR&ED incentive 82 3.1% 69.4%
Capital gains exemption-- small-business shares, farming and fishing property 72 2.7% 72.1%
Farm fuel benefit 71 2.7% 74.8%
Bioenergy producer credit program 69 2.6% 77.4%
Carbon capture and storage 53 2.0% 79.4%
Flow-through share deduction 35 1.3% 80.8%
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TABLE A4 TOP TEN BUSINESS-SUBSIDY PROGRAMS - ONTARIO 2014-15
$ Millions Share of Total Cumulative share
Small business deduction 1,595 27.7% 27.7%
Support for solar- and wind-generated electricity 460 8.0% 35.7%
SR&ED incentives 340 5.9% 41.7%
Reduced rate for aviation fuel 290 5.0% 46.7%
Capital gains exemption-- small-business shares, farming and fishing property 245 4.3% 51.0%
Apprenticeship training tax credit 244 4.3% 55.2%
Excise-tax exemption for fuel 190 3.3% 58.5%
Investment in GM 182 3.2% 61.7%
Tax credit for manufacturing & processing 175 3.0% 64.7%
Interactive digital media tax credit 152 2.6% 67.4%
TABLE A5 TOP TEN BUSINESS-SUBSIDY PROGRAMS - QUEBEC 2014-15
$ Millions Share of Total Cumulative share
SR&ED incentives 672 15.0% 15.0%
Small business deduction 469 10.5% 25.5%
Farm income insurance programs 446 10.0% 35.4%
Support for the development of e-commerce 292 6.5% 42.0%
Hydro Québec targeted price reductions 285 6.4% 48.3%
General support from the Economic Development Fund 229 5.1% 53.4%
Financing assistance by Investment Québec 171 3.8% 57.3%
Support for production of multimedia titles 151 3.4% 60.6%
Labour investment fund tax assistance 146 3.3% 63.9%
Property tax refund for farmers 133 3.0% 66.9%
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WHETHER IT IS THE U.S. HOUSE OR SENATE TAX CUT PLAN – IT’S TROUBLE FOR CANADIAN COMPETITIVENESS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Final-Tax-Policy-Trends-Tax-Cuts-and-Jobs-Act.pdf
Jack Mintz and Philip Bazel | November 2017
BUSINESS CASES FOR MAJOR PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN CANADA
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Public-Infrastructure-Projects-Iacobacci-final.pdf
Mario Iacobacci | November 2017
TAXING FEEDLOTS IN ALBERTA: LETHBRIDGE COUNTY’S TAX ON CONFINED FEEDING OPERATIONS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Taxing-Feedlots-Dahlby-McMillan-Khanal.pdf
Bev Dahlby, Melville McMillan and Mukesh Khanal | November 2017
PUTTING THE ALBERTA BUDGET ON A NEW TRAJECTORY
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/AB-Budget-New-Trajectory-MacKinnon-Mintz-final.pdf
Janice MacKinnon and Jack Mintz | October 2017
INDIGENOUS POLICY CONFERENCE SUMMARY REPORT: BEYOND RECONCILIATION
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Indigenous-Policy-Conference-Lorefice-Boyd-Caron.pdf
Sophie Lorefice, Brendan Boyd and Gaétan Caron | October 2017
TAX POLICY TRENDS: SMALL BUSINESS TAX CUT NOT ENOUGH – U.S. TAX REFORMS WILL MAKE U.S. MORE ATTRACTIVE FOR START-UPS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Tax-Policy-Trends-Small-Business-Tax-Changes_Final.pdf
Jack Mintz and V. Balaji Venkatachalam | October 2017
SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Social-Trends-SA-October-Final.pdf
Margarita Gres Wilkins and Ronald Kneebone | October 2017
TAX POLICY TRENDS: REPUBLICANS REVEAL PROPOSED TAX OVERHAUL
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Tax-Policy-Trends-Bazel-and-Mintz-Final.pdf
Philip Bazel and Jack Mintz | October 2017
SOFTWOOD LUMBER – SOME LESSONS FROM THE LAST SOFTWOOD (LUMBER IV) DISPUTE
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Softwood-Lumber-Feldman.pdf
Elaine Feldman | October 2017
BIG AND LITTLE FEET: A COMPARISON OF PROVINCIAL LEVEL CONSUMPTION- AND PRODUCTION-BASED EMISSIONS FOOTPRINTS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Big-and-Little-Feet-Dobson-Fellows.pdf
Sarah Dobson and G. Kent Fellows | September 2017
